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Abstract: Increasingly encompassing models have been suggested for our world. Theories
range from generally accepted to increasingly speculative to apparently bogus. The
progression of theories from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to universe and multiverse
theories and beyond was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the sizes of the postulated
worlds, with humans being expelled from their center to ever more remote and random
locations. Rather than leading to a true theory of everything, this trend faces a turning point
after which the predictive power of such theories decreases (actually to zero). Incorporating
the location and other capacities of the observer into such theories avoids this problem
and allows to distinguish meaningful from predictively meaningless theories. This also
leads to a truly complete theory of everything consisting of a (conventional objective)
theory of everything plus a (novel subjective) observer process. The observer localization
is neither based on the controversial anthropic principle, nor has it anything to do with
the quantum-mechanical observation process. The suggested principle is extended to more
practical (partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric) world models (rather than theories
of everything). Finally, I provide a justification of Ockham’s razor, and criticize the anthropic
principle, the doomsday argument, the no free lunch theorem, and the falsifiability dogma.
Keywords: world models; observer localization; predictive power; Ockham’s razor;
universal theories; inductive reasoning; simplicity and complexity; universal self-sampling;
no-free-lunch; computability
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“... in spite of it’s incomputability, Algorithmic Probability can serve as a kind of ‘Gold
Standard’ for induction systems”
— Ray Solomonoff (1997)
“There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the Universe is for
and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre
and inexplicable. There is another theory which states that this has already happened.”
— Douglas Adams, Hitchhikers guide to the Galaxy (1979)
List of Notation
G,H,E,P,S,C,M,U,R,A,... specific models/theories defined in Section 2
T ∈{G,H,E,P,S,C,M,U,R,A,...} theory/model
ToE Theoy of Everything (in any sense)
ToE candidate a theory that might be a partial or perfect or wrong ToE
UToE Universal ToE
CToE Complete ToE (i+e+l+n+o)
UCToE Universal Complete ToE
theory model which can explain≈describe≈predict≈compress observations
universe typically refers to visible/observed universe
multiverse un- or only weakly connected collection of universes
predictive power precision and coverage
precision the accuracy of a theory
coverage how many phenomena a theory can explain/predict
prediction refers to unseen, usually future observations
computability assumption: that our universe is computable
qT ∈{0,1}∗ the program that generates the universe modeled by theory T
uq∈{0,1}∞ the universe generated by program q: uq=UTM(q)
UTM Universal Turing Machine
s∈{0,1}∗ observation model/program. Extracts o from u.
oqs∈{0,1}∞ Subject’s s observations in universe uq: oqs=UTM(s,uq)
otrue1:t True past observations
q˘,u˘ Program and universe of UToE
S(o|u) Probability of observing o in universe u
Q(u) Probability of universe u (according to some prob. theory T )
P (o) Probability of observing o
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1. Introduction
This paper uses an information-theoretic and computational approach for addressing the
philosophical problem of judging theories (of everything) in physics. In order to keep the paper generally
accessible, I’ve tried to minimize field-specific jargon and mathematics, and focus on the core problem
and its solution.
By theory I mean any model which can explain≈describe≈predict≈compress [1] our observations,
whatever the form of the model. Scientists often say that their model explains some phenomenon. What
is usually meant is that the model describes (the relevant aspects of) the observations more compactly
than the raw data. The model is then regarded as capturing a law (of nature), which is believed to hold
true also for unseen/future data.
This process of inferring general conclusions from example instances is call inductive reasoning. For
instance, observing 1000 black ravens but no white one supports but cannot prove the hypothesis that all
ravens are black. In general, induction is used to find properties or rules or models of past observations.
The ultimate purpose of the induced models is to use them for making predictions, e.g., that the next
observed raven will also be black. Arguably inductive reasoning is even more important than deductive
reasoning in science and everyday life: for scientific discovery, in machine learning, for forecasting in
economics, as a philosophical discipline, in common-sense decision making, and last but not least to
find theories of everything. Historically, some famous, but apparently misguided philosophers [2,3],
including Popper and Miller, even disputed the existence, necessity or validity of inductive reasoning.
Meanwhile it is well-known how minimum encoding length principles [4,5], rooted in (algorithmic)
information theory [6], quantify Ockham’s razor principle, and lead to a solid pragmatic foundation of
inductive reasoning [7]. Essentially, one can show that the more one can compress, the better one can
predict, and vice versa.
A deterministic theory/model allows from initial conditions to determine an observation sequence,
which could be coded as a bit string. For instance, Newton mechanics maps initial planet
positions+velocities into a time-series of planet positions. So a deterministic model with initial
conditions is “just” a compact representation of an infinite observation string. A stochastic model is
“just” a probability distribution over observation strings.
Classical models in physics are essentially differential equations describing the time-evolution of
some aspects of the world. A Theory of Everything (ToE) models the whole universe or multiverse,
which should include initial conditions. As I will argue, it can be crucial to also localize the observer,
i.e., to augment the ToE with a model of the properties of the observer, even for non-quantum-mechanical
phenomena. I call a ToE with observer localization, a Complete ToE (CToE).
That the observer itself is important in describing our world is well-known. Most prominently in
quantum mechanics, the observer plays an active role in ‘collapsing the wave function’. This is a specific
and relatively well-defined role of the observer for a particular theory, which is not my concern. I will
show that (even the localization of) the observer is indispensable for finding or developing any (useful)
ToE. Often, the anthropic principle is invoked for this purpose (our universe is as it is because otherwise
we would not exist). Unfortunately its current use is rather vague and limited, if not outright unscientific
[8]. In Section 6 I extend Schmidhuber’s formal work [9] on computable ToEs to formally include
observers. Schmidhuber [9] already discusses observers and mentions sampling universes consistent
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with our own existence, but this part stays informal. I give a precise and formal account of observers
by explicitly separating the observer’s subjective experience from the objectively existing universe or
multiverse, which besides other things shows that we also need to localize the observer within our
universe (not only which universe the observer is in).
In order to make the main point of this paper clear, Section 2 first traverses a number of models that
have been suggested for our world, from generally accepted to increasingly speculative and questionable
theories. Section 3 discusses the relative merits of the models, in particular their predictive power
(precision and coverage). We will see that localizing the observer, which is usually not regarded as
an issue, can be very important. Section 4 gives an informal introduction to the necessary ingredients
for CToEs, and how to evaluate and compare them using a quantified instantiation of Ockham’s razor.
Section 5 gives a formal definition of what accounts for a CToE, introduces more realistic observers
with limited perception ability, and formalizes the CToE selection principle. The Universal ToE is a
sanity critical point in the development of ToEs, and will be investigated in more detail in Section 6.
Extensions to more practical (partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric) theories (rather than ToEs)
are briefly discussed in Section 7. In Section 8 I show that Ockham’s razor is well-suited for finding
ToEs and briefly criticize the anthropic principle, the doomsday argument, the no free lunch theorem,
and the falsifiability dogma. Section 9 concludes.
2. Theories of Something, Everything & Nothing
A number of models have been suggested for our world. They range from generally accepted to
increasingly speculative to outright unacceptable. For the purpose of this work it doesn’t matter where
you personally draw the line. Many now generally accepted theories have once been regarded as insane,
so using the scientific community or general public as a judge is problematic and can lead to endless
discussions: for instance, the historic geo↔heliocentric battle; and the ongoing discussion of whether
string theory is a theory of everything or more a theory of nothing. In a sense this paper is about a
formal rational criterion to determine whether a model makes sense or not. In order to make the main
point of this paper clear, below I will briefly traverse a number of models. Space constraints prevent
to explain these models properly, but most of them are commonly known; see e.g. [10,11] for surveys.
The presented bogus models help to make clear the necessity of observer localization and hence the
importance of this work.
(G) Geocentric model. In the well-known geocentric model, the Earth is at the center of the universe and
the Sun, the Moon, and all planets and stars move around Earth. The ancient model assumed concentric
spheres, but increasing precision in observations and measurements revealed a quite complex geocentric
picture with planets moving with variable speed on epicycles. This Ptolemaic system predicted the
celestial motions quite well for its time, but was relatively complex in the common sense and in the
sense of involving many parameters that had to be fitted experimentally.
(H) Heliocentric model. In the modern (later) heliocentric model, the Sun is at the center of the
solar system (or universe), with all planets (and stars) moving in ellipses around the Sun. Copernicus
developed a complete model, much simpler than the Ptolemaic system, which interestingly did not offer
better predictions initially, but Kepler’s refinements ultimately outperformed all geocentric models. The
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price for this improvement was to expel the observers (humans) from the center of the universe to one
out of 8 moving planets. While today this price seems small, historically it was quite high. Indeed we
will compute the exact price later.
(E) Effective theories. After the celestial mechanics of planets have been understood, ever more
complex phenomena could be captured with increasing coverage. Newton’s mechanics unifies celestial
and terrestrial gravitational phenomena. When unified with special relativity theory one arrives at
Einstein’s general relativity, predicting large scale phenomena like black holes and the big bang.
On the small scale, electrical and magnetic phenomena are unified by Maxwell’s equations for
electromagnetism. Quantum mechanics and electromagnetism have further been unified to quantum
electrodynamics (QED). QED is the most powerful theory ever invented, in terms of precision and
coverage of phenomena. It is a theory of all physical and chemical processes, except for radio-activity
and gravity.
(P) Standard model of particle physics. Salam, Glashow and Weinberg extended QED to include weak
interactions, responsible for radioactive decay. Together with quantum chromo dynamic [12], which
describes the nucleus, this constitutes the current standard model (SM) of particle physics. It describes
all known non-gravitational phenomena in our universe. There is no experiment indicating any limitation
(precision, coverage). It has about 20 unexplained parameters (mostly masses and coupling constants)
that have to be (and are) experimentally determined (although some regularities can be explained [13]).
The effective theories of the previous paragraph can be regarded as approximations of SM, hence SM,
although founded on a subatomic level, also predicts medium scale phenomena.
(S) String theory. Pure gravitational and pure quantum phenomena are perfectly predictable by general
relativity and the standard model, respectively. Phenomena involving both, like the big bang, require
a proper final unification. String theory is the candidate for a final unification of the standard model
with the gravitational force. As such it describes the universe at its largest and smallest scale, and all
scales in-between. String theory is essentially parameter-free, but is immensely difficult to evaluate and
it seems to allow for many solutions (spatial compactifications). For these and other reasons, there is
currently no uniquely accepted cosmological model.
(C) Cosmological models. Our concept of what the universe is, seems to ever expand. In ancient times
there was Earth, Sun, Moon, and a few planets, surrounded by a sphere of shiny points (fixed stars). The
current textbook universe started in a big bang and consists of billions of galaxy clusters each containing
billions of stars, probably many with a planetary system. But this is just the visible universe. According
to inflation models, which are needed to explain the homogeneity of our universe, the “total” universe is
vastly larger than the visible part.
(M) Multiverse theories. Many theories (can be argued to) imply a multitude of essentially disconnected
universes (in the conventional sense), often each with their own (quite different) characteristics [14].
In Wheeler’s oscillating universe a new big bang follows the assumed big crunch, and this repeats
indefinitely. Lee Smolin proposed that every black hole recursively produces new universes on the
“other side” with quite different properties. Everett’s many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics
postulates that the wave function doesn’t collapse but the universe splits (decoheres) into different
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branches, one for each possible outcome of a measurement. Some string theorists have suggested that
possibly all compactifications in their theory are realized, each resulting in a different universe.
(U) Universal ToE. The last two multiverse suggestions contain the seed of a general idea. If theory
X contains some unexplained elements Y (quantum or compactification or other indeterminism), one
postulates that every realization of Y results in its own universe, and we just happen to live in one of
them. Often the anthropic principle is used in some hand-waving way to argue why we are in this and
not that universe [8]. Taking this to the extreme, Schmidhuber [9,15] postulates a multiverse (which
I call universal universe) that consists of every computable universe (note there are “just” countably
many computer programs). Clearly, if our universe is computable, then it is contained in the universal
universe, so we have a ToE already in our hands. Similar in spirit but neither constructive nor formally
well-defined is Tegmark’s mathematical multiverse [16].
(R) Random universe. Actually there is a much simpler way of obtaining a ToE. Consider an infinite
sequence of random bits (fair coin tosses). It is easy to see that any finite pattern, i.e., any finite
binary sequence, occurs (actually infinitely often) in this string. Now consider our observable universe
quantized at e.g. Planck level, and code the whole space-time universe into a huge bit string. If the
universe ends in a big crunch, this string is finite. (Think of a digital high resolution 3D movie of the
universe from the big bang to the big crunch). This big string also appears somewhere in our random
string, hence our random string is a perfect ToE. This is reminiscent of the Boltzmann brain idea that
in a sufficiently large random universe, there exist low entropy regions that resemble our own universe
and/or brain (observer) [17, Sec.3.8].
(A) All-a-Carte models. The existence of true randomness is controversial and complicates many
considerations. So ToE (R) may be rejected on this ground, but there is a simple deterministic computable
variant. Glue the natural numbers written in binary format, 1,10,11,100,101,110,111,1000,1001,... to
one long string.
1101110010111011110001001...
The decimal version is known as Champernowne’s number. Obviously it contains every finite
substring by construction. Indeed, it is a Normal Number in the sense that it contains every substring
of length n with the same relative frequency (2−n). Many irrational numbers like
√
2, pi, and e are
conjectured to be normal. So Champernowne’s number and probably even
√
2 are perfect ToEs.
Remarks. I presume that every reader of this section at some point regarded the remainder as bogus. In
a sense this paper is about a rational criterion to decide whether a model is sane or insane. The problem
is that the line of sanity differs for different people and different historical times.
Moving the earth out of the center of the universe was (and for some even still is) insane. The standard
model is accepted by nearly all physicists as the closest approximation to a ToE so far. Only outside
physics, often by opponents of reductionism, this view has been criticized. Some respectable researchers
including Nobel Laureates go further and take string theory and even some Multiverse theories serious.
Universal ToE also has a few serious proponents. Whether Boltzmann’s random noise or my All-a-Carte
ToE find adherers needs to be seen. For me, Universal ToE (U) is the sanity critical point. Indeed UToE
will be investigated in greater detail in later sections.
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References to the dogmatic Bible, Popper’s misguided falsifiability principle [2,3], and wrong
applications of Ockham’s razor are the most popular pseudo justifications of what theories are (in)sane.
More serious arguments involving the usefulness of a theory will be discussed in the next section.
3. Predictive Power & Observer Localization
In the last section I have enumerated some models of (parts or including) the universe, roughly sorted
in increasing size of the universe. Here I discuss their relative merits, in particular their predictive power
(precision and coverage). Analytical or computational tractability also influences the usefulness of a
theory, but can be ignored when evaluating its status as a ToE. For example, QED is computationally a
nightmare, but this does not at all affect its status as the theory of all electrical, magnetic, and chemical
processes. On the other hand, we will see that localizing the observer, which is usually not regarded as
an issue, can be very important. The latter has nothing to do with the quantum-mechanical measuring
process, although there may be some deeper yet to be explored connection.
Particle physics. The standard model has more power and hence is closer to a ToE than all effective
theories (E) together. String theory plus the right choice of compactification reduces to the standard
model, so has the same or superior power. The key point here is the inclusion of the “right choice of
compactification”. Without it, string theory is in some respect less powerful than SM.
Baby universes. Let us now turn to the cosmological models, in particular Smolin’s baby universe
theory, in which infinitely many universes with different properties exist. The theory “explains” why
a universe with our properties exist (since it includes universes with all kinds of properties), but it has
little predictive power. The baby universe theory plus a specification in which universe we happen to live
would determine the value of the inter-universe variables for our universe, and hence have much more
predictive power. So localizing ourselves increases the predictive power of the theory.
Universal ToE. Let us consider the even larger universal multiverse. Assuming our universe is
computable, the multiverse generated by UToE contains and hence perfectly describes our universe. But
this is of little use, since we can’t use UToE for prediction. If we knew our “position” in this multiverse,
we would know in which (sub)universe we are. This is equivalent to knowing the program that generates
our universe. This program may be close to any of the conventional cosmological models, which indeed
have a lot of predictive power. Since locating ourselves in UToE is equivalent and hence as hard as
finding a conventional ToE of our universe, we have not gained much.
All-a-Carte models also contain and hence perfectly describe our universe. If and only if we can
localize ourselves, we can actually use it for predictions. (For instance, if we knew we were in the
center of universe 001011011 we could predict that we will ‘see’ 0010 when ‘looking’ to the left and
1011 when looking to the right.) Let u be a snapshot of our space-time universe; a truly gargantuan
string. Locating ourselves means to (at least) locate u in the multiverse. We know that u is the u’s
number in Champernowne’s sequence (interpreting u as a binary number), hence locating u is equivalent
to specifying u. So a ToE based on normal numbers is only useful if accompanied by the gargantuan
snapshot u of our universe. In light of this, an “All-a-Carte” ToE (without knowing u) is rather a theory
of nothing than a theory of everything.
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Localization within our universe. The loss of predictive power when enlarging a universe to a
multiverse model has nothing to do with multiverses per se. Indeed, the distinction between a universe
and a multiverse is not absolute. For instance, Champernowne’s number could also be interpreted as a
single universe, rather than a multiverse. It could be regarded as an extreme form of the infinite fantasia
land from the NeverEnding Story, where everything happens somewhere. Champernowne’s number
constitutes a perfect map of the All-a-Carte universe, but the map is useless unless you know where
you are. Similarly but less extreme, the inflation model produces a universe that is vastly larger than its
visible part, and different regions may have different properties.
Egocentric to Geocentric model. Consider now the “small” scale of our daily life. A young child
believes it is the center of the world. Localization is trivial. It is always at “coordinate” (0,0,0). Later it
learns that it is just one among a few billion other people and as little or much special as any other person
thinks of themself. In a sense we replace our egocentric coordinate system by one with origin (0,0,0)
in the center of Earth. The move away from an egocentric world view has many social advantages, but
dis-answers one question: Why am I this particular person and not any other? (It also comes at the cost
of constantly having to balance egoistic with altruistic behavior.)
Geocentric to Heliocentric model. While being expelled from the center of the world as an individual,
in the geocentric model, at least the human race as a whole remains in the center of the world, with
the remaining (dead?) universe revolving around us. The heliocentric model puts Sun at (0,0,0) and
degrades Earth to planet number 3 out of 8. The astronomic advantages are clear, but dis-answers one
question: Why this planet and not one of the others? Typically we are muzzled by questionable anthropic
arguments [8,18]. (Another scientific cost is the necessity now to switch between coordinate systems,
since the ego- and geocentric views are still useful.)
Heliocentric to modern cosmological model. The next coup of astronomers was to degrade our Sun
to one star among billions of stars in our milky way, and our milky way to one galaxy out of billions of
others. It is generally accepted that the question why we are in this particular galaxy in this particular
solar system is essentially unanswerable.
Summary. The exemplary discussion above has hopefully convinced the reader that we indeed
lose something (some predictive power) when progressing to too large universe and multiverse
models. Historically, the higher predictive power of the large-universe models (in which we are
seemingly randomly placed) overshadowed the few extra questions they raised compared to the smaller
ego/geo/helio-centric models. (we’re not concerned here with the psychological disadvantages/damage,
which may be large). But the discussion of the (physical, universal, random, and all-a-carte) multiverse
theories has shown that pushing this progression too far will at some point harm predictive power. We
saw that this has to do with the increasing difficulty to localize the observer.
4. Complete ToEs (CToEs)
A ToE by definition is a perfect model of the universe. It should allow to predict all phenomena. Most
ToEs require a specification of some initial conditions, e.g. the state at the big bang, and how the state
evolves in time (the equations of motion). In general, a ToE is a program that in principle can “simulate”
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the whole universe. An All-a-Carte universe perfectly satisfies this condition but apparently is rather a
theory of nothing than a theory of everything. So meeting the simulation condition is not sufficient for
qualifying as a Complete ToE. We have seen that (objective) ToEs can be completed by specifying the
location of the observer. This allows us to make useful predictions from our (subjective) viewpoint. We
call a ToE plus observer localization a subjective or complete ToE. If we allow for stochastic (quantum)
universes we also need to include the noise. If we consider (human) observers with limited perception
ability we need to take that into account too. So
A complete ToE needs specification of
(i) initial conditions
(e) state evolution
(l) localization of observer
(n) random noise
(o) perception ability of observer
We will ignore noise and perception ability in the following and resume to these issues in Sections 7
and 5, respectively. Next we need a way to compare ToEs.
Epistemology. I assume that the observers’ experience of the world consists of a single temporal binary
sequence which gets longer with time. This is definitely true if the observer is a robot equipped with
sensors like a video camera whose signal is converted to a digital data stream, fed into a digital computer
and stored in a binary file of increasing length. In humans, the signal transmitted by the optic and
other sensory nerves could play the role of the digital data stream. Of course (most) human observers
do not possess photographic memory. We can deal with this limitation in various ways: digitally
record and make accessible upon request the nerve signals from birth till now, or allow for uncertain
or partially remembered observations. Classical philosophical theories of knowledge [19] (e.g., as
justified true belief) operate on a much higher conceptual level and therefore require stronger (and
hence more disputable) philosophical presuppositions. In my minimalist “spartan” information-theoretic
epistemology, a bit-string is the only observation, and all higher ontologies are constructed from it and
are pure “imagination”.
Predictive power and elegance. Whatever the intermediary guiding principles for designing
theories/models (elegance, symmetries, tractability, consistency), the ultimate judge is predictive
success. Unfortunately we can never be sure whether a given ToE makes correct predictions in the
future. After all we cannot rule out that the world suddenly changes tomorrow in a totally unexpected
way (cf. the quote at beginning of this article). We have to compare theories based on their predictive
success in the past. It is also clear that the latter is not enough: For every model we can construct an
alternative model that behaves identically in the past but makes different predictions from, say, year 2020
on. Popper’s falsifiability dogma is little helpful. Beyond postdictive success, the guiding principle in
designing and selecting theories, especially in physics, is elegance and mathematical consistency. The
predictive power of the first heliocentric model was not superior to the geocentric one, but it was much
simpler. In more profane terms, it has significantly less parameters that need to be specified.
Ockham’s razor suitably interpreted tells us to choose the simpler among two or more otherwise equally
good theories. For justifications of Ockham’s razor, see [6] and Section 8. Some even argue that by
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definition, science is about applying Ockham’s razor, see [20]. For a discussion in the context of theories
in physics, see [21]. It is beyond the scope of this paper to repeat these considerations. In Sections 4 and
8 I will show that simpler theories more likely lead to correct predictions, and therefore Ockham’s razor
is suitable for finding ToEs.
Complexity of a ToE. In order to apply Ockham’s razor in a non-heuristic way, we need to quantify
simplicity or complexity. Roughly, the complexity of a theory can be defined as the number of symbols
one needs to write the theory down. More precisely, write down a program for the state evolution
together with the initial conditions, and define the complexity of the theory as the size in bits of the
file that contains the program. This quantification is known as algorithmic information or Kolmogorov
complexity [6] and is consistent with our intuition, since an elegant theory will have a shorter program
than an inelegant one, and extra parameters need extra space to code, resulting in longer programs [4,5].
From now on I identify theories with programs and write Length(q) for the length=complexity of
program=theory q.
Standard model versus string theory. To keep the discussion simple, let us pretend that standard
model (SM) + gravity (G) and string theory (S) both qualify as ToEs. SM+Gravity is a mixture of a few
relatively elegant theories, but contains about 20 parameters that need to be specified. String theory is
truly elegant, but ensuring that it reduces to the standard model needs sophisticated extra assumptions
(e.g., the right compactification).
SM+G can be written down in one line, plus we have to give 20+ constants, so lets say one page.
The meaning (the axioms) of all symbols and operators require another page. Then we need the basics,
natural, real, complex numbers, sets (ZFC), etc., which is another page. That makes 3 pages for a
complete description in first-order logic. There are a lot of subtleties though: (a) The axioms are likely
mathematically inconsistent, (b) it’s not immediately clear how the axioms lead to a program simulating
our universe, (c) the theory does not predict the outcome of random events, and (d) some other problems.
So to transform the description into a C program simulating our universe, needs a couple of pages more,
but I would estimate around 10 pages overall suffices, which is about 20,000 symbols=bytes. Of course
this program will be (i) a very inefficient simulation and (ii) a very naive coding of SM+G. I conjecture
that the shortest program for SM+G on a universal Turing machine is much shorter, maybe even only
one tenth of this. The numbers are only a quick rule-of-thumb guess. If we start from string theory (S),
we need about the same length. S is much more elegant, but we need to code the compactification to
describe our universe, which effectively amounts to the same. Note that everything else in the world (all
other physics, chemistry, etc.) is emergent.
It would require a major effort to quantify which theory is the simpler one in the sense defined above,
but I think it would be worth the effort. It is a quantitative objective way to decide between theories that
are (so far) predictively indistinguishable.
CToE selection principle. It is trivial to write down a program for an All-a-Carte multiverse (A). It is
also not too hard to write a program for the universal multiverse (U), see Section 6. Lengthwise (A) easily
wins over (U), and (U) easily wins over (P) and (S), but as discussed (A) and (U) have serious defects.
On the other hand, these theories can only be used for predictions after extra specifications: Roughly, for
(A) this amounts to tabling the whole universe, (U) requires defining a ToE in the conventional sense,
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(P) needs 20 or so parameters and (S) a compactification scheme. Hence localization-wise (P) and (S)
easily win over (U), and (U) easily wins over (A). Given this trade-off, it now nearly suggests itself that
we should include the description length of the observer location in our ToE evaluation measure. That
is,
among two CToEs, select the one that has shorter overall length
Length(i) + Length(e) + Length(l) (1)
For an All-a-Carte multiverse, the last term contains the gargantuan string u, catapulting it from the
shortest ToE to the longest CToE, hence (A) will not minimize (1).
ToE versus UToE. Consider any (C)ToE and its program q, e.g., (P) or (S). Since (U) runs all programs
including q, specifying q means localizing (C)ToE q in (U). So (U)+q is a CToE whose length is just some
constant bits (the simulation part of (U)) more than that of (C)ToE q. So whatever (C)ToE physicists
come up with, (U) is nearly as good as this theory. This essentially clarifies the paradoxical status of (U).
Naked, (U) is a theory of nothing, but in combination with another ToE it excels to a good CToE, albeit
slightly longer=worse than the latter.
Localization within our universe. So far we have only localized our universe in the multiverse, but not
ourselves in the universe. To localize our Sun, we could, e.g., sort (and index) stars by their creation
date, which the model (i)+(e) provides. Most stars last for 1-10 billion years (say an average of 5 billion
years). The universe is 14 billion years old, so most stars may be 3rd generation (Sun definitely is), so the
total number of stars that have ever existed should very roughly be 3 times the current number of stars of
about 1011×1011. Probably “3” is very crude, but this doesn’t really matter for sake of the argument. In
order to localize our Sun we only need its index, which can be coded in about log2(3×1011×1011) .=75
bits. Similarly we can sort and index planets and observers. To localize earth among the 8 planets
needs 3 bits. To localize yourself among 7 billion humans needs 33 bits. Alternatively one could simply
specify the (x,y,z,t) coordinate of the observer, which requires more but still only very few bits. These
localization penalties are tiny compared to the difference in predictive power (to be quantified later)
of the various theories (ego/geo/helio/cosmo). This explains and justifies theories of large universes in
which we occupy a random location.
5. Complete ToE - Formalization
This section formalizes the CToE selection principle and what accounts for a CToE. Universal Turing
machines are used to formalize the notion of programs as models for generating our universe and our
observations. I also introduce more realistic observers with limited perception ability.
Objective ToE. Since we essentially identify a ToE with a program generating a universe, we need to fix
some general purpose programming language on a general purpose computer. In theoretical computer
science, the standard model is a so-called Universal Turing Machine (UTM) [6]. It takes a program
coded as a finite binary string q ∈ {0,1}∗, executes it and outputs a finite or infinite binary string u ∈
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{0,1}∗∪{0,1}∞. The details do not matter to us, since drawn conclusions are typically independent of
them. In this section we only consider q with infinite output
UTM(q) = uq1u
q
2u
q
3 ... =: u
q
1:∞
In our case, uq1:∞ will be the space-time universe (or multiverse) generated by ToE candidate q. So q
incorporates items (i) and (e) of Section 4. Surely our universe doesn’t look like a bit string, but can be
coded as one as explained in Sections 2 and 7. We have some simple coding in mind, e.g. uq1:N being
the (fictitious) binary data file of a high-resolution 3D movie of the whole universe from big bang to big
crunch, augmented by uqN+1:∞≡0 if the universe is finite. Again, the details do not matter.
Observational process and subjective complete ToE. As we have demonstrated it is also important
to localize the observer. In order to avoid potential qualms with modeling human observers, consider
as a surrogate a (conventional not extra cosmic) video camera filming=observing parts of the world.
The camera may be fixed on Earth or installed on an autonomous robot. It records part of the
universe u denoted by o= o1:∞. (If the lifetime of the observer is finite, we append zeros to the finite
observation o1:N ).
I only consider direct observations like with a camera. Electrons or atomic decays or quasars are
not directly observed, but with some (classical) instrument. It is the indicator or camera image of the
instrument that is observed (which physicists then usually interpret). This setup avoids having to deal
with any form of informal correspondence between theory and real world, or with subtleties of the
quantum-mechanical measurement process. The only philosophical presupposition I make is that it is
possible to determine uncontroversially whether two finite binary strings (on paper or file) are the same
or differ in some bits.
In a computable universe, the observational process within it, is obviously also computable, i.e., there
exists a program s∈{0,1}∗ that extracts observations o from universe u. Formally
UTM(s, uq1:∞) = o
sq
1:∞ (2)
where we have extended the definition of UTM to allow access to an extra infinite input stream uq1:∞.
So osq1:∞ is the sequence observed by subject s in universe u
q
1:∞ generated by q. Program s contains all
information about the location and orientation and perception abilities of the observer/camera, hence
specifies not only item (l) but also item (o) of Section 4.
A Complete ToE (CToE) consists of a specification of a (ToE,subject) pair (q,s). Since it includes s
it is a Subjective ToE.
CToE selection principle. So far, s and q were fictitious subjects and universe programs. Let otrue1:t be
the past observations of some concrete observer in our universe, e.g., your own personal experience of
the world from birth till today. The future observations otruet+1:∞ are of course unknown. By definition,
o1:t contains all available experience of the observer, including e.g., outcomes of scientific experiments,
school education, read books, etc.
The observation sequence osq1:∞ generated by a correct CToE must be consistent with the true
observations otrue1:t . If o
sq
1:t would differ from o
true
1:t (in a single bit) the subject would have ‘experimental’
evidence that (q,s) is not a perfect CToE. We can now formalize the CToE selection principle as follows
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Among a given set of perfect (osq1:t = o
true
1:t ) CToEs {(q, s)}
select the one of smallest length Length(q) + Length(s) (3)
Minimizing length is motivated by Ockham’s razor. Inclusion of s is necessary to avoid degenerate
ToEs like (U) and (A). The selected CToE (q∗,s∗) can and should then be used for forecasting future
observations via ...oforecastt+1:∞ =UTM(s
∗,uq
∗
1:∞).
6. Universal ToE - Formalization
The Universal ToE is a sanity critical point in the development of ToEs, and will formally be defined
and investigated in this section.
Definition of Universal ToE. The Universal ToE generates all computable universes. The generated
multiverse can be depicted as an infinite matrix in which each row corresponds to one universe.
q UTM(q)
 u1 u

2 u

3 u

4 u

5 · · ·
0 u01 u
0
2 u
0
3 u
0
4 · · · · · ·
1 u11 u
1
2 u
1
3 · · · · · ·
00 u001 u
00
2 · · · · · ·
...
...
...
...
To fit this into our framework we need to define a single program q˘ that generates a single string
corresponding to this matrix. The standard way to linearize an infinite matrix is to dovetail in diagonal
serpentines though the matrix:
u˘1:∞ := u1u
0
1u

2u

3u
0
2u
1
1u
00
1 u
1
2u
0
3u

4u

5u
0
4u
1
3u
00
2 ...
Formally, define a bijection i=〈q,k〉 between a (program, location) pair (q,k) and the natural numbers
IN 3 i, and define u˘i := uqk. It is not hard to construct an explicit program q˘ for UTM that computes
u˘1:∞=u
q˘
1:∞=UTM(q˘).
One might think that it would have been simpler or more natural to generalize Turing machines to
have matrix “tapes”. But this is deceiving. If we allow for Turing machines with matrix output, we also
should allow for and enumerate all programs q that have a matrix output. This leads to a 3d tensor that
needs to be converted to a 2d matrix, which is no simpler than the linearization above.
Partial ToEs. Cutting the universes into bits and interweaving them into one string might appear messy,
but is unproblematic for two reasons: First, the bijection i = 〈q,k〉 is very simple, so any particular
universe string uq can easily be recovered from u˘. Second, such an extraction will be included in the
localization / observational process s, i.e., s will contain a specification of the relevant universe q and
which bits k are to be observed.
More problematic is that many q will not produce an infinite universe. This can be fixed as follows:
First, we need to be more precise about what it means for UTM(q) to write uq. We introduce an extra
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symbol ‘#’ for ‘undefined’ and set each bit uqi initially to ‘#’. The UTM running q can output bits in any
order but can overwrite each location # only once, either with a 0 or with a 1. We implicitly assumed
this model above, and similarly for s. Now we (have to) also allow for q that leave some or all bits
unspecified.
The interleaving computation UTM(s,UTM(q)) = o of s and q works as follows: Whenever s wants
to read a bit from uq1:∞ that q has not (yet) written, control is transferred to q until this bit is written. If
it is never written, then o will be only partially defined, but such s are usually not considered. (If the
undefined location is before t, CToE (q,s) is not perfect, since otrue1:t is completely defined.)
Alternatively one may define a more complex dynamic bijection 〈·,·〉 that orders the bits in the order
they are created, or one resorts to generalized Turing machines [9,22] which can overwrite locations
and also greatly increase the set of describable universes. These variants (allow to) make u˘ and all uq
complete (no ‘#’ symbol, tape∈{0,1}∞).
ToE versus UToE. We can formalize the argument in the last section of simulating a ToE by UToE as
follows: If (q,s) is a CToE, then (q˘,s˜) based on UToE q˘ and observer s˜ :=rqs, where program r extracts
uq from u˘ and then osq from uq, is an equivalent but slightly larger CToE, since UTM(s˜,u˘) = oqs =
UTM(s,uq) by definition of s˜ and Length(q˘)+Length(s˜)=Length(q)+Length(s)+O(1).
The best CToE. Finally, one may define the best CToE (of an observer with experience otrue1:t ) as
UCToE := arg min
q,s
{Length(q) + Length(s) : osq1:t = otrue1:t }
where osq1:∞=UTM(s,UTM(q)). This may be regarded as a formalization of the holy grail in physics; of
finding such a TOE.
7. Extensions
Our CToE selection principle is applicable to perfect, deterministic, discrete, and complete models
q of our universe. None of the existing sane world models is of this kind. In this section I extend the
CToE selection principle to more realistic, partial, approximate, probabilistic, and/or parametric models
for finite, infinite and even continuous universes.
Partial theories. Not all interesting theories are ToEs. Indeed, most theories are only partial models of
aspects of our world.
We can reduce the problem of selecting good partial theories to CToE selection as follows: Let otrue1:t
be the complete observation, and (q,s) be some theory explaining only some observations but not all. For
instance, q might be the heliocentric model and s be such that all bits in otrue1:t that correspond to planetary
positions are predicted correctly. The other bits in oqs1:t are undefined, e.g. the position of cars. We can
augment q with a (huge) table b of all bits for which oqsi 6= otruei . Together, (q,b,s) allows to reconstruct
otrue1:t exactly. Hence for two different theories, the one with smaller length
Length(q) + Length(b) + Length(s) (4)
should be selected. We can actually spare ourselves from tabling all those bits that are unpredicted by all
q under consideration, since they contribute the same overall constant. So when comparing two theories
it is sufficient to consider only those observations that are correctly predicted by one (or both) theories.
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If two partial theories (q,s) and (q′,s′) predict the same phenomena equally well (i.e., oqs1:t = o
q′s′
1:t 6=
otrue1:t ), then b=b
′ and minimizing (4) reduces to minimizing (3).
Approximate theories. Most theories are not perfect but only approximate reality, even in their
limited domain. The geocentric model is less accurate than the heliocentric model, Newton’s mechanics
approximates general relativity, etc. Approximate theories can be viewed as a version of partial theories.
For example, consider predicting locations of planets with locations being coded by (truncated) real
numbers in binary representation, then Einstein gets more bits right than Newton. The remaining
erroneous bits could be tabled as above. Errors are often more subtle than simple bit errors, in which
case correction programs rather than just tables are needed.
Celestial example. The ancient celestial models just capture the movement of some celestial bodies, and
even those only imperfectly. Nevertheless it is interesting to compare them. Let us take as our corpus of
observations otrue1:t , say, all astronomical tables available in the year 1600, and ignore all other experience.
The geocentric model qG more or less directly describes the observations, hence sG is relatively
simple. In the heliocentric model qH it is necessary to include in sH a non-trivial coordinate
transformation to explain the geocentric astronomical data. Assuming both models were perfect, then,
if and only if qH is simpler than qG by a margin that is larger than the extra complications due to the
coordinate transformation (Length(qG)−Length(qH)>Length(sH)−Length(sG)), we should regard the
heliocentric model as better.
If/since the heliocentric model is more accurate, we have to additionally penalize the geocentric model
by the number of bits it doesn’t predict correctly. This clearly makes the heliocentric model superior.
Probabilistic theories. Contrary to a deterministic theory that predicts the future from the past for sure, a
probabilistic theory assigns to each future a certain chance that it will occur. Equivalently, a deterministic
universe is described by some string u, while a probabilistic universe is described by some probability
distribution Q(u), the a priori probability of u. (In the special case of Q(u′) = 1 for u′= u and 0 else,
Q describes the deterministic universe u.) Similarly, the observational process may be probabilistic. Let
S(o|u) be the probability of observing o in universe u. Together, (Q,S) is a probabilistic CToE that
predicts observation o with probability P (o)=
∑
uS(o|u)Q(u). A computable probabilistic CToE is one
for which there exist programs (of lengths Length(Q) and Length(S)) that compute the functions Q(·)
and S(·|·).
Consider now the true observation otrue1:t . The larger P (o
true
1:t ) the “better” is (Q,S). In the degenerate
deterministic case, P (otrue1:t ) = 1 is maximal for a correct CToE, and 0 for a wrong one. In every other
case, (Q,S) is only a partial theory that needs completion, since it does not compute otrue1:t . Given P , it
is possible to code otrue1:t in |log2P (otrue1:t )| bits (arithmetic or Shannon-Fano code). Assuming that otrue1:t
is indeed sampled from P , one can show that with high probability this is the shortest possible code. So
there exists an effective description of otrue1:t of length
Length(Q) + Length(S) + |log2P (otrue1:t )| (5)
This expression should be used (minimized) when comparing probabilistic CToEs. The principle is
reminiscent of classical two-part Minimum Encoding Length principles like MML and MDL [4,5]. Note
that the noise corresponds to the errors and the log term to the error table of the previous paragraphs.
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Probabilistic examples. Assume S(o|o) = 1∀o and consider the observation sequence otrue1:t = utrue1:t =
11001001000011111101101010100. If we assume this is a sequence of fair coin flips, then Q(o1:t) =
P (o1:t)=2
−t are very simple functions, but |log2P (o1:t)|=t is large. If we assume that otrue1:t is the binary
expansion of pi (which it is), then the corresponding deterministic Q is somewhat more complex, but
|log2P (otrue1:t )|=0. So for sufficiently large t, the deterministic model of pi is selected, since it leads to a
shorter code (5) than the fair-coin-flip model.
Quantum theory is (argued by physicists to be) truly random. Hence all modern ToE candidates (P+G,
S, C, M) are probabilistic. This yields huge additive constants |log2P (otrue1:t )| to the otherwise quite
elegant theories Q. Schmidhuber [9,15] argues that all apparent physical randomness is actually only
pseudo random, i.e., generated by a small program. If this is true and we could find the random number
generator, we could instantly predict all apparent quantum-mechanical random events. This would be
a true improvement of existing theories, and indeed the corresponding CToE would be significantly
shorter. In [20, Sec.8.6.2] I give an argument why believing in true random noise may be an unscientific
position.
Theories with parameters. Many theories in physics depend on real-valued parameters. Since
observations have finite accuracy, it is sufficient to specify these parameters to some finite accuracy.
Hence the theories including their finite-precision parameters can be coded in finite length. There are
general results and techniques [4,5] that allow a comfortable handling of all this. For instance, for smooth
parametric models, a parameter accuracy of O(1/
√
n) is needed, which requires 1
2
log2n+O(1) bits per
parameter. The explicable O(1) term depends on the smoothness of the model and prevents ‘cheating’
(e.g. zipping two parameters into one).
Infinite and continuous universes. So far we have assumed that each time-slice through our universe
can be described in finitely many bits and time is discrete. Assume our universe were the infinite
continuous 3+1 dimensional Minkowski space IR4 occupied by (tiny) balls (“particles”). Consider all
points (x,y,z,t)∈IR4 with rational coordinates, and let i=〈x,y,z,t〉 be a bijection to the natural numbers
similarly to the dovetailing in Section 6. Let ui=1 if (x,y,z,t) is occupied by a particle and 0 otherwise.
String u1:∞ is an exact description of this universe. The above idea generalizes to any so-called separable
mathematical space. Since all spaces occurring in established physical theories are separable, there
is currently no ToE candidate that requires uncountable universes. Maybe continuous theories are
just convenient approximations of deeper discrete theories. An even more fundamental argument put
forward in this context by [9] is that the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem (an apparent paradox) implies
that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) has a countably infinite model. Since all physical theories so far
are formalizable in ZFC, it follows they all have a countable model. For some strange reason (possibly
an historical artifact), the adopted uncountable interpretation seems just more convenient.
Multiple theories. Some proponents of pluralism and some opponents of reductionism argue that we
need multiple theories on multiple scales for different (overlapping) application domains. They argue
that a ToE is not desirable and/or not possible. Here I give a reason why we need one single fundamental
theory (with all other theories having to be regarded as approximations): Consider two Theories (T1 and
T2) with (proclaimed) application domains A1 and A2, respectively.
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If predictions of T1 and T2 coincide on their intersection A1∩A2 (or if A1 and A2 are disjoint), we
can trivially “unify” T1 and T2 to one theory T by taking their union. Of course, if this does not result
in any simplification, i.e., if Length(T ) = Length(T1)+Length(T2), we gain nothing. But since nearly
all modern theories have some common basis, e.g. use natural or real numbers, a formal unification of
the generating programs nearly always leads to Length(q)<Length(q1)+Length(q2).
The interesting case is when T1 and T2 lead to different forecasts on A1∩A2. For instance, particle
versus wave theory with the atomic world at their intersection, unified by quantum theory. Then we need
a reconciliation of T1 and T2, that is, a single theory T for A1∪A2. Ockham’s razor tells us to choose a
simple (elegant) unification. This rules out naive/ugly/complex solutions like developing a third theory
for A1∩A2 or attributing parts of A1∩A2 to T1 or T2 as one sees fit, or averaging the predictions of T1
and T2. Of course T must be consistent with the observations.
Pluralism on a meta level, i.e., allowing besides Ockham’s razor other principles for selecting theories,
has the same problem on a meta-level: which principle should one use in a concrete situation? To argue
that this (or any other) problem cannot be formalized/quantized/mechanized would be (close to) an
anti-scientific attitude.
8. Justification of Ockham’s Razor
We now prove Ockham’s razor under the assumptions stated below and compare it to the No Free
Lunch myth. The result itself is not novel [9]. The intention and contribution is to provide an elementary
but still sufficiently formal argument, which in particular is free of more sophisticated concepts like
Solomonoff’s a-priori distribution.
Ockham’s razor principle demands to “take the simplest theory consistent with the observations”.
Ockham’s razor could be regarded as correct if among all considered theories, the one
selected by Ockham’s razor is the one that most likely leads to correct predictions.
Assumptions. Assume we live in the universal multiverse u˘ that consists of all computable universes,
i.e., UToE is a correct/true/perfect ToE. Since every computable universe is contained in UToE, it
is at least under the computability assumption impossible to disprove this assumptions. The second
assumption we make is that our location in the multiverse is random. We can divide this into two steps:
First, the universe uq in which we happen to be is chosen randomly. Second, our “location” s within uq
is chosen at random. We call these the universal self-sampling assumption. The crucial difference to the
informal anthropic self-sampling assumption used in doomsday arguments is discussed below.
Recall the observer program s˜ := rqs introduced in Section 5. We will make the simplifying
assumption that s is the identity, i.e., restrict ourselves to “objective” observers that observe their universe
completely: UTM(s˜,u˘) = oqs = UTM(s,uq) = uq = UTM(q). Formally, the universal self-sampling
assumption can be stated as follows:
A priori it is equally likely to be in any of the universes uq generated by some program
q∈{0,1}∗.
To be precise, we consider all programs with length bounded by some constant L, and take the limit
L→∞.
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Counting consistent universes. Let otrue1:t =utrue1:t be the universe observed so far and
QL := {q : Length(q) ≤ L and UTM(q) = utrue1:t ∗}
be the set of all consistent universes (which is non-empty for large L), where * is any continuation
of utrue1:t . Given u
true
1:t , we know we are in one of the universes in QL, which implies by the universal
self-sampling assumption a uniform sampling in QL. Let
qmin := arg min
q
{Length(q) : q ∈ QL} and l := Length(qmin)
be the shortest consistent q and its length, respectively. Adding (unread) “garbage” g after the end of a
program q does not change its behavior, i.e., if q∈QL, then also qg∈QL provided that Length(qg)≤L.
Hence for every g with Length(g) ≤ L− l, we have qming ∈ QL. Since there are about 2L−l such g,
we have |QL|>∼ 2L−l. It is a deep theorem in algorithmic information theory [6] that there are also not
significantly more than 2L−l programs q equivalent to qmin. The proof idea is as follows: One can show
that if there are many long equivalent programs, then there must also be a short one. In our case the
shortest one is qmin, which upper bounds the number of long programs. Together this shows that
|QL| ≈ 2L−l
Probabilistic prediction. Given observations utrue1:t we now determine the probability of being in
a universe that continues with ut+1:n, where n > t. Similarly to the previous paragraph we can
approximately count the number of such universes:
QnL := {q : Length(q) ≤ L and UTM(q) = utrue1:t ut+1:n∗} ⊂ QL
qnmin := arg min
q
{Length(q) : q ∈ QnL} and ln := Length(qnmin)
|QnL| ≈ 2L−ln
The probability of being in a universe with future ut+1:n given utrue1:t is determined by their relative
number
P (ut+1:n|utrue1:t ) =
|QnL|
|QL| ≈ 2
−(ln−l) (6)
which is (asymptotically) independent of L.
Ockham’s razor. Relation (6) implies that the most likely continuation uˆt+1:n :=
argmaxut+1:nP (ut+1:n|utrue1:t ) is (approximately) the one that minimizes ln. By definition, qmin is
the shortest program in QL=
⋃
ut+1:n
QnL. Therefore
P (uˆt+1:n|utrue1:t ) ≈ P (uqmint+1:n|utrue1:t )
The accuracy of ≈ is clarified later. In words
We are most likely in a universe that is (equivalent to) the simplest universe consistent with
our past observations.
This shows that Ockham’s razor selects the theory that most likely leads to correct predictions, and
hence proves (under the stated assumptions) that Ockham’s razor is correct.
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Ockham’s razor is correct under the universal self-sampling assumption.
Discussion. It is important to note that the universal self-sampling assumption has not by itself any bias
towards simple models q. Indeed, most q in QL have length close to L, and since we sample uniformly
from QL this actually represents a huge bias towards large models for L→∞.
The result is also largely independent of the uniform sampling assumption. For instance, sampling a
length l∈ IN w.r.t. any reasonable (i.e., slower than exponentially decreasing) distribution and then q of
length l uniformly leads to the same conclusion.
How reasonable is the UToE? We have already discussed that it is nearly but not quite as good as any
other correct ToE. The philosophical, albeit not practical advantage of UToE is that it is a safer bet, since
we can never be sure about the future correctness of a more specific ToE. An a priori argument in favor
of UToE is as follows: What is the best candidate for a ToE before, i.e., in absence of any observations?
If somebody (but how and who?) would tell us that the universe is computable but nothing else, universal
self-sampling seems like a reasonable a priori UToE.
Comparison to anthropic self-sampling. Our universal self-sampling assumption is related to anthropic
self-sampling [18] but crucially different. The anthropic self-sampling assumption states that a priori you
are equally likely any of the (human) observers in our universe. First, we sample from any universe and
any location (living or dead) in the multiverse and not only among human (or reasonably intelligent)
observers. Second, we have no problem of what counts as a reasonable (human) observer. Third, our
principle is completely formal.
Nevertheless the principles are related since (see inclusion of s) given otrue1:t we also sample from the
set of reasonable observers, since otrue1:t includes snapshots of other (human) observers.
No Free Lunch (NFL) myth. Wolpert [23] considers algorithms for finding the minimum of a function,
and compares their average performance. The simplest performance measure is the number of function
evaluations needed to find the global minimum. The average is taken uniformly over the set of all
functions from and to some fixed finite domain. Since sampling uniformly leads with (very) high
probability to a totally random function (white noise), it is clear that on average no optimization
algorithm can perform better than exhaustive search, and no reasonable algorithm (that is one that probes
every function argument at most once) performs worse. That is, all reasonable optimization algorithms
are equally bad on average. This is the essence of Wolpert’s NFL theorem and all variations thereof I am
aware of, including the ones for less uniform distributions.
While NFL theorems are nice observations, they are obviously irrelevant, since we usually do not
care about the maximum of white noise functions, but functions that appear in real-world problems.
Despite NFL being the holy grail in some research communities, the NFL myth has little to no practical
implication [24].
An analogue of NFL for prediction would be as follows: Let u1:n ∈ {0,1}n be uniformly sampled,
i.e., the probability of u1:n is λ(u1:n) = 2−n. Given utrue1:t we want to predict ut+1:n. Let u
p
t+1:n be any
deterministic prediction. It is clear that all deterministic predictors p are on average equally bad (w.r.t.
symmetric performance measures) in predicting uniform noise (λ(upt+1:n|utrue1:t )=2−(n−t)) .
How does this compare to the positive result under universal self-sampling? There we also used a
uniform distribution, but over effective models=theories=programs. A priori we assumed all programs
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to be equally likely, but the resulting universe distribution is far from uniform. Phrased differently, we
piped uniform noise (via M , see below) through a universal Turing machine. We assume a universal
distribution M , rather than a uniform distribution λ.
Just assuming that the world has any effective structure breaks NFL down, and makes Ockham’s razor
work [25]. The assumption that the world has some structure is as safe as (or I think even weaker than)
the assumption that e.g. classical logic is good for reasoning about the world (and the latter one has to
assume to make science meaningful).
Some technical details∗. Readers not familiar with Algorithmic Information Theory might want to skip
this paragraph. P (u) in (6) tends for L→∞ to Solomonoff’s a priori distributionM(u). In the definition
of M [26] only programs of length =L, rather than ≤L are considered, but since limL→∞ 1L
∑L
l=1al =
limL→∞aL if the latter exists, they are equivalent. Modern definitions involve a 2−l(q)-weighted sum
of prefix programs, which is also equivalent [6]. Finally, M(u) is also equal to the probability that
a universal monotone Turing machine with uniform random noise on the input tape outputs a string
starting with u [20]. Further, l≡Length(qmin) =Km(u) is the monotone complexity of u :=utrue1:t . It is
a deep result in Algorithmic Information Theory that Km(u)≈−log2M(u). For most u equality holds
within an additive constant, but for some u only within logarithmic accuracy [6]. Taking the ratio of
M(u)≈2−Km(u) for u=utrue1:t ut+1:n and u=utrue1:t yields (6).
The argument/result is not only technical but also subtle: Not only are there 2L−l programs equivalent
to qmin but there are also “nearly” 2L−l programs that lead to totally different predictions. Luckily they
don’t harm probabilistic predictions based on P , and seldomly affect deterministic predictions based on
qmin in practice but can do so in theory [27]. One can avoid this problem by augmenting Ockham’s razor
with Epicurus principle of multiple explanations, taking all theories consistent with the observations but
weigh them according to their length. See [6,20] for details.
9. Discussion
Summary. I have demonstrated that a theory that perfectly describes our universe or multiverse,
rather than being a Theory of Everything (ToE), might also be a theory of nothing. I have shown
that a predictively meaningful theory can be obtained if the theory is augmented by the localization
of the observer. This resulted in a truly Complete Theory of Everything (CToE), which consists of a
conventional (objective) ToE plus a (subjective) observer process. Ockham’s razor quantified in terms of
code-length minimization has been invoked to select the “best” theory (UCToE).
Assumptions. The construction of the subjective complete theory of everything rested on the following
assumptions: (i) The observers’ experience of the world consists of a single temporal binary sequence
otrue1:t . All other physical and epistemological concepts are derived. (ii) There exists an objective world
independent of any particular observer in it. (iii) The world is computable, i.e., there exists an algorithm
(a finite binary string) which when executed outputs the whole space-time universe. This assumption
implicitly assumes (i.e., implies) that temporally stable binary strings exist. (iv) The observer is a
computable process within the objective world. (v) The algorithms for universe and observer are chosen
at random, which I called universal self-sampling assumption.
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Implications. As demonstrated, under these assumptions, the scientific quest for a theory of everything
can be formalized. As a side result, this allows to separate objective knowledge q from subjective
knowledge s. One might even try to argue that if q for the best (q,s) pair is non-trivial, this is evidence
for the existence of an objective reality. Another side result is that there is no hard distinction between
a universe and a multiverse; the difference is qualitative and semantic. Last but not least, another
implication is the validity of Ockham’s razor.
Conclusion. Respectable researchers, including Nobel Laureates, have dismissed and embraced each
single model of the world mentioned in Section 2, at different times in history and concurrently.
(Excluding All-a-Carte ToEs which I haven’t seen discussed before.) As I have shown, Universal ToE is
the sanity critical point.
The most popular (pseudo) justifications of which theories are (in)sane have been references to the
dogmatic Bible, Popper’s limited falsifiability principle, and wrong applications of Ockham’s razor.
This paper contained a more serious treatment of world model selection. I introduced and discussed the
usefulness of a theory in terms of predictive power based on model and observer localization complexity.
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